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Abstract
Many of the conceptual problems students have in understanding quantum mechan-
ics arise from the way probabilities are introduced in standard (textbook) quantum
theory through the use of measurements. Introducing consistent microscopic probabil-
ities in quantum theory requires setting up appropriate sample spaces taking proper
account of quantum incompatibility. When this is done the Schro¨dinger equation can
be used to calculate probabilities independent of whether a system is or is not being
measured, and the results usually ascribed to wave function collapse are obtained in a
less misleading way through conditional probabilities. Toy models that include mea-
surement apparatus as part of the total quantum system make this approach accessible
to students. Some comments are made about teaching this material.
I Introduction
Quantum mechanics is a difficult subject to teach, and there has been a significant
effort to find out what problems students have in understanding it, and how to overcome
them.1,2,3. In part the difficulties arise from unfamiliar mathematics: partial differential
equations, complex linear algebra (or functional analysis), and probability theory. However,
the greatest difficulty is surely the one encapsulated in Feynman’s well-known assertion that
“Nobody understands quantum mechanics.”4 How are students to learn a subject that their
teachers do not understand?
Feynman’s own masterful exposition of the subject5 is proof that physicists can, indeed,
teach what we do not understand, or do not understand as well as we would like to. At
the same time, what he said needs to be taken seriously; Feynman was not joking. The
problems he had understanding the subject are also severe barriers to less brilliant minds,
and the basic thesis of this article is that helping students overcome them, rather than
sweeping them under the carpet, is well worth the effort. That is most obvious in the case of
future professional physicists or electrical engineers who will need to deal with entanglement,
quantum information, transport in nanocircuits, and similar subjects for which the approach
found in current textbooks does not provide a helpful physical intuition. But for the sake of
other students as well, we need to try and counter the quasi-magical view of the quantum
world that results from trying to make sense of what one finds in current textbooks, not to
1
mention popular expositions written by authors who understand quantum mechanics even
less that Feynman did, but are less forthright in confessing their ignorance.
At the heart of the conceptual difficulties of quantum theory is the failure of the current
textbook version of the subject—often called “Copenhagen” or “standard” quantum me-
chanics—to introduce probabilities in quantum theory in a consistent and meaningful way.
Instead, probabilities are introduced on the basis of measurements, an approach which con-
veniently gets around various difficulties, but leaves students with a confused idea of what
quantum mechanics is all about, and the impression that understanding the subject is im-
possible. Instead they get the feeling that one should, to use Mermin’s memorable phrase,6
“shut up and calculate.” That measurements provide an unsatisfactory approach to quantum
interpretation has been known for a long time in the quantum foundations community,7,8
where the “measurement problem” is widely considered both an embarrassment9 and an
intractable difficulty10. More about this in Sec. II.
The consistent or decoherent histories, hereafter abbreviated to “histories,” approach to
quantum theory11,12,13,14 allows one to introduce probabilities in a physically meaningful
and mathematically consistent way without reference to measurements. Doing so requires
that one confront head on the central conceptual difficulty of quantum mechanics: quantum
incompatibility. This is discussed in Sec. III in terms of a spin-half particle. No interpretation
of quantum mechanics can be considered satisfactory if it cannot make both mathematical
(the easy part) and physical (the hard part) sense of this, the simplest of quantum systems.
Probabilistic or stochastic time development in quantum mechanics requires the notion
of a quantum history, a concept which in itself is not particularly difficult, Sec. IV. Assigning
probabilities without using measurements can then be done using the Born rule (not hard)
and its extensions (more subtle) applied to a closed or isolated quantum system, i.e., one
to which Schro¨dinger’s equation applies. What is going on in a real measurement process
using quantum mechanical apparatus (no other kind is currently available) can then be
understood by applying the fundamental probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics to the
measured system and apparatus, regarded as a single quantum system. The discussion in
Sec. IV attempts to communicate the essential ideas while omitting the technical machinery
that is available elsewhere.15
In addition to the rules, students need simple examples which illustrate in physical terms
what the formalism is all about. Section V is a brief introduction to what I call “toy models,”
with application to a decaying nucleus and the subsequent detection of an alpha particle.
This shows how quantum theory can be applied in principle to analyze real measurements
without treating “measurement” as an axiom, and without using wave function collapse.
The topic of measurements continues in Sec. VI, where it is explained how and why one
can interpret a Stern-Gerlach measurement as revealing a value of spin angular momentum
before the particle was measured, and why the usual textbook approach, though not wrong,
is seriously misleading.
All well and good, but can one teach this new understanding to students who are not
as bright as Feynman? In Sec. VII I discuss my own experience, along with a few practical
problems involved in introducing the new approach into the curriculum. The more difficult
question of whether doing so is worthwhile is taken up in the concluding Sec. VIII.
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II What Is Wrong With Measurements
The basic difficulty Feynman and everyone else has had understanding quantum theory
comes from the need to introduce probabilities into the theory in a consistent way. It is
well known that Einstein was opposed on aesthetic and philosophical grounds to a theory
that was random at the fundamental level: God does not throw dice. However, his search
for a deterministic quantum mechanics ended in failure, and at present the prospects of
finding such a theory do not look hopeful. Consider the decay of radioactive nuclei, such as
carbon 14. So far as we know at present, this is a purely random process: there is nothing
inside a particular carbon 14 nucleus which determines whether it will decay 10 minutes
from now, or in 10 years or in 10,000 years. No experiment has been able to separate any
species of nucleus of this sort into a batch that will decay quickly and one that will take
longer.16 The simplest explanation is that there is nothing in the nucleus before it decays,
no “hidden variable,” that determines when it will decay. Attempts to introduce hidden
variables into quantum mechanics lead both to a more complicated theory, and as shown by
Bell,17 to mysterious long-range influences for which there is not the slightest experimental
evidence.18 Thus it seems that most contemporary physicists have abandoned Einstein’s
hope for a deterministic theory and accept the need to understand quantum mechanics
as something intrinsically probabilistic or stochastic, as first proposed by Born19 in 1926,
shortly after Schro¨dinger published his famous (time-dependent) equation.
But how to introduce probabilities into quantum theory? The textbook approach em-
ploys measurements, and if the textbook has been carefully written these probabilities refer
to measurement outcomes, traditionally called “pointer positions” in the quantum founda-
tions literature, and not to the microscopic events the apparatus was designed to measure.
There is a very good reason for making this distinction. The naive assumption that ev-
ery conceivable measurement outcome corresponds to a microscopic property leads to many
paradoxes.20. By not talking about what is really being measured and confining the discus-
sion to the macroscopic world, where classical physics applies to a good approximation, the
paradoxes are avoided, and one has a consistent way of handling experimental results stored
in macroscopic form in photographs or on magnetic disks. This “black box” approach, in
which quantum wave functions and density operators are nothing but mathematical tools
summarizing macroscopic preparation procedures, and used to calculate probabilities for
the outcomes of macroscopic measurements, has much to recommend it in terms of overall
consistency.21
The trouble with the black box approach is that it provides no physical intuition about
what is going on at the atomic level. Hence the physicist who wants to understand what
the world is all about is no more likely to heed warnings against opening the box than are
the children in one of Grimm’s fairy tales. While his chances of not getting into trouble
are somewhat better than theirs, he still faces a significant probability of being eaten by the
alligators inhabiting the vast swamp of inconsistent ideas and paradoxes lying inside the box,
or, to change the metaphor, just beneath the surface of measurement-based interpretations
of quantum mechanics. We know they are there from many decades of research in quantum
foundations. If teachers and textbooks cannot bring themselves to be as frank as Feynman,
they should at least consider posting warning signs! But it would be even better to get rid
of the alligators by draining the swamp: by introducing probabilities for microscopic events
in a fully consistent way, accompanied by an appropriate physical interpretation.22
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Yet more confusion is created by treatises that interpret “measurement” to mean a pro-
jective measurement of the sort introduced by von Neumann23, in which a measurement
is supposed to “collapse” or “reduce” the wave function of the measured system into that
eigenstate of the measured (microscopic) physical variable that corresponds to the apparatus
pointer position. Most real measurements on microscopic systems are not of this sort. Far
more common are situations in which the measured system is destroyed in the process of
measurement (e.g., a photon is absorbed), or its properties seriously altered, and the experi-
mentalist interprets the outcome in terms of properties the measured system had before the
measurement took place; e.g., the energy of an alpha particle before it entered and stopped
inside a detector. Textbook quantum theory thus fails to provide the tools needed to inter-
pret real experiments in quantum mechanical terms. In addition, wave function collapse is
a concept which itself gives rise to needless conceptual headaches. It is not actually needed
in quantum theory, since its real function is that of a tool for calculating conditional prob-
abilities, and this can be done just as well by other methods which are conceptually clearer
and less likely to mislead; see the example in Sec. V.
Rather than treating probabilities as peculiar things somehow associated with measure-
ments, it is much better to consider them part of the fundamental laws of nature which apply
to all quantum phenomena, including measurements as particular cases. Why suppose that
radioactive nuclei only decay when they are being measured? In practice, physicists do not
assume that. Instead, we calculate decay rates of carbon 14 without asking whether the
nuclei are being measured, or the decay rates of uranium 235 at an epoch when there were
no human beings around to do the measurements, or aluminum 26 in outer space, where the
need to introduce measurements seems even more ludicrous. Probabilities can, indeed, be
introduced as fundamental laws. But before explaining how to do it, we need to address a
central conceptual issue in quantum theory, which when left unattended leads to all sorts of
problems.
III Quantum Incompatibility
In classical statistical mechanics probabilities are assigned to regions in the classical
phase space. For a quantum system the analog is the quantum Hilbert space. However,
there is an important differences between the two which needs to be taken into account in
a consistent theory of quantum probabilities. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where (a) shows
the phase space for a one-dimensional harmonic oscillator, and (b)—in schematic form, for
we have replaced a complex space with a real space—the two-dimensional Hilbert space for
a spin-half particle.
A physical property of a classical particle corresponds to a region in the phase space where
this property is true. For example, the region inside the ellipse in Fig. 1(a) corresponds to
the property that the total energy E is less than E0, while the lower half plane represents the
property that the momentum p is negative. Classical properties combined with the logical
connective AND correspond to the intersection of the corresponding regions, as in a Venn
diagram: E < E0 AND p < 0 is represented by the shaded region inside the ellipse. In
some cases combining two properties in this way yields a property which is always false, e.g.,
E < E0 AND E > 2E0 corresponds to the empty set. However, it is still meaningful, and
the negation of a false property is a true property. Negation corresponds to the set-theoretic
4
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(a)
|ψ〉
|ψ˜〉 |χ〉
(b)
Figure 1: (a) Classical phase space for harmonic oscillator. (b) Two-dimensional quantum
Hilbert space
complement; thus NOT E < E0 is the same as E ≥ E0, the region outside the ellipse in the
figure.
Following von Neumann24, we represent a quantum property by a ray or one-dimensional
subspace of the Hilbert space, i.e., the collection of all kets of the form {c|ψ〉} where |ψ〉 is
fixed and c is any complex number. Examples are shown in Fig. 1(b). More generally, a
quantum property corresponds to a subspace25 of the Hilbert space; e.g., think of a two-
dimensional plane passing through the origin of a three-dimensional space. The negation of
a quantum property—again we follow von Neumann—is not the set-theoretic complement of
this subspace, but instead its orthogonal complement, the subspace of kets that are orthogonal
to (have zero inner product with) all kets in the original subspace. Thus in Fig. 1(b) the
negation of the property corresponding to |ψ〉 is represented by the ray |ψ˜〉 perpendicular
to the |ψ〉 ray. So far as I know, all physicists accept von Neumann’s definition of negation,
which makes good physical sense. For example, in the case of a quantum harmonic oscillator,
E < E0 is naturally associated with the subspace spanned by linear combinations of energy
eigenstates {|n〉} which have (n+ 1
2
)~ω < E0, and its negation to the (infinite-dimensional)
subspace spanned by those with (n + 1
2
)~ω ≥ E0. In the case of a spin-half particle the
negation of Sz = +1/2 (in units of ~) is the ray corresponding to Sz = −1/2. Since in
ordinary logic either a statement or its negation is true, we conclude that in the case of
a spin-half particle either Sz = +1/2 or Sz = −1/2, in agreement with the experimental
result of Stern and Gerlach26 when one interprets their experiment as they themselves did
(and which, as we shall see in Sec. VI, is fully justified by modern quantum mechanics),
as indicating the property that the particle (in their case a silver atom) had before the
measurement took place.
Note, however, a striking contrast between classical and quantum properties, Fig. 1(a)
and (b). In the classical case a property and its negation fill up the entire phase space,
whereas for the quantum case the rays corresponding to |ψ〉 and its negation |ψ˜〉 do not even
begin to fill up the Hilbert space. There are plenty of other rays, such as the one associated
with |χ〉, a ket which is neither a multiple of |ψ〉 nor orthogonal to it. What can we say
about them? In some sense this is the central conceptual difficulty of quantum mechanics,
and no physical interpretation that fails to deal with it—at least no scheme based on the
quantum Hilbert space along with von Neumann’s notion of negation—can hope to succeed.
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Von Neumann himself was quite aware of the problem, and he and Birkhoff27 in a paper
that is at least as important for the field of quantum foundations as the better known one
by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen28, proposed a solution requiring a radical modification
of propositional logic. Alas, we physicists have not been able to make much use of it for
understanding quantum mechanics. Perhaps we just are not bright enough, and someday
robots will use it to make sense of the quantum world. But in the meantime we can make
considerable progress using something much less radical.
The histories approach handles this difficulty through the concept of quantum incompat-
ibility, as per the following illustration. Whereas both “Sx = +1/2” and “Sz = −1/2” are
meaningful statements about a spin-half particle at a particular instant of time, the logical
combination “Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = −1/2” is meaningless in the precise sense that Hilbert-
space quantum mechanics can assign it no meaning. All the rays in the two-dimensional
Hilbert space—at this point we need to think of the complex analog of Fig. 1(b) (points
on the Bloch sphere for the reader familiar with that concept)—already have a physical
interpretation, namely that the component of spin angular momentum in a particular direc-
tion in space, call it w, is +1/2, and there is none left over which could plausibly represent
“Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = −1/2.” Could this be a statement which is always false, like the
classical E < E0 AND E > 2E0 considered earlier? The trouble is that the negation of a
meaningful statement which is always false is one that is always true, such as E ≥ E0 OR
E ≤ 2E0 for a classical oscillator. However, the negation of “Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = −1/2,”
which is “Sx = −1/2 OR Sz = +1/2,” does not look like a good candidate for a statement
that is always true, and in fact pursuing this route quickly leads to contradictory results if
one employs the rules of standard logic.29 On the other hand, the negation of a meaningless
statement is equally meaningless, so there is no problem as long as we agree that joining
“Sx = −1/2” and “Sz = +1/2” with OR is no more sensible than joining them with AND.
Compatibility and incompatibility for larger quantum systems are most conveniently dis-
cussed by considering the projectors (orthogonal projection operators) onto the subspaces
corresponding to the different properties. If P and Q are projectors representing two sub-
spaces, or two properties denoted by the same letters, they are compatible if and only if
PQ = QP , in which case PQ is itself a projector onto the subspace corresponding to “P
AND Q.” Otherwise, they are incompatible. In textbooks the term “incompatible” is em-
ployed in a similar way, but with reference to observables (physical variables represented by
self-adjoint operators), and one is told that they cannot be simultaneously measured. Mak-
ing reference to properties (projectors or subspaces) is both technically and conceptually
simpler than referring to observables. When they are incompatible they indeed cannot be
simultaneously measured, because what is meaningless cannot be measured.
Since in the classical world everything commutes, there is no exact analog of quantum
incompatibility to be found in our everyday experience. However, the following analogies
may help tease out some of what it does and does not mean. A photographer taking pictures
of Mount Shasta can do so from a variety of different directions or perspectives: north, south,
east, etc. The perspective is chosen by the photographer and has no effect on the reality
represented by the mountain. The chosen perspective makes it possible to answer certain
questions but not others on the basis of the resulting photograph: a view from the south
will not indicate what is happening on the northern slopes. Next, replace the photographer
with a classical physicist who has designed an apparatus to measure the w component of
angular momentum of a golf ball by an apparatus consisting of a cage initially at rest and
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pivoted on low friction bearings which allow it to rotate around an axis in the w direction.
If it can be arranged that the moving golf ball flies into and is trapped in the center of the
cage, the final rate of rotation of the cage can be converted into a value for the angular
momentum of the golf ball just before it entered the cage, i.e., just before the measurement
was made. The choice of orientation w is made by the physicist, and this choice has no effect
upon the properties of the golf ball prior to the measurement, though it does determine
what he can say about those properties after the measurement is over. Finally, replace the
classical physicist with a quantum physicist who measures Sw for a spin-half particle using a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus with the field gradient in the direction w. The choice of w is made
by the physicist and has no effect upon the properties of the spin-half particle before it is
measured, a point to which we will return in Sec. VI. It does, however, determine what can
be said about the earlier state of the particle on the basis of the measurement outcome.
How does the last situation differ from the first two? A photographer could arrange to
have a colleague take a picture of Mount Shasta as viewed from the north at the same time as
he takes one from the south, and together the photographs would provide more information
than either one by itself, since the two perspectives are compatible with each other. The
classical physicist could in principle make high speed photographs of the golf ball from which
he could deduce the axis and rate of rotation, and thereby all components of its angular
momentum, since these are compatible parts of a complete description of a macroscopic
spinning body. But no corresponding possibility is available to the quantum physicist: the
different components of angular momentum of a spin-half particle are incompatible, and since
trying to combine one component with another yields a meaningless result, no measurement
could possibly determine the two values simultaneously. And saying, “I measured Sx = −1/2
in this case; what would have been the result had I decided instead to measure Sz?” is to
pose a tricky counterfactual question which easily leads to misunderstanding.30
IV Quantum Time Dependence
If Schro¨dinger’s (time-dependent) equation is deterministic, how is it possible to introduce
in a fundamental way a stochastic or probabilistic time development in quantum theory?
Born’s simple but ingenious idea19 was to use Schro¨dinger’s equation to calculate probabili-
ties. The following analogy may be helpful. Classical Brownian motion of a particle modeled
by a Wiener process is random: the future behavior of the particle is not determined by its
present position or its past behavior. Nonetheless the probability distribution density ρ(r, t)
for its position as a function of time t satisfied the deterministic diffusion equation
∂ρ/∂t = D∇2ρ. (1)
Why cannot one think of Schro¨dinger’s equation in a similar way, as a deterministic equation
that generates probabilities?
One can, and in fact current textbooks do use Schro¨dinger’s equation for this purpose, but
in a half-hearted and somewhat inconsistent way. Following a tradition that goes back at least
to von Neumann,31 the time evolution of a quantum system is thought of as involving two
distinct steps. First one solves Schro¨dinger’s equation to obtain a deterministic unitary time
development of the wave function, which tends to be thought of intuitively as representing
the “real” physical state of the microscopic quantum system. Then the system of interest
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interacts with an external measuring apparatus, resulting in a random process that leads
to a situation in which the measurement outcome, the only thing to which a probability
can properly be applied, is somehow associated with the state of the particle after the
measurement has been completed. The unsatisfactory nature of this approach using wave
function collapse has already been discussed in Sec. II.
Probabilities can be introduced in a more consistent and natural way by following the
route used in ordinary probability theory.32 There the first step is to introduce a sample space
of mutually-exclusive events, one and only one of which occurs in any particular experiment.
For example, if one rolls a die, the number of spots on the top face when it comes to rest will
be a number between 1 and 6; if 5 occurs, 3 does not occur, etc. The quantum counterpart
is a set of mutually-orthogonal subspaces of the Hilbert space whose projectors (orthogonal
projection operators) form a decomposition of the identity I: a collection {Pj} satisfying
I =
∑
j
Pj , PjPk = δjkPj . (2)
Note that PjPk = PkPj , so the properties are compatible; otherwise it would not make sense
to speak of one of them occurring rather than another; see the discussion in Sec. III. The
fact that PjPk = 0 for j 6= k corresponds to the properties being mutually exclusive: if
one occurs the other does not. That the projectors sum to the identity means that one
of them will necessarily occur, or be true, at the time in question. An orthonormal basis
{|φj〉}, j = 1, 2 . . ., in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space gives rise to a a decomposition of
the identity with Pj = |φ
j〉〈φj|. Note that real dice are quantum objects made up of atoms,
hence describable (in principle) using a large Hilbert space, and any visibly distinct states,
such as those with different numbers of spots on the top face, will correspond to mutually-
orthogonal projectors. Thus (2) works for both microscopic and macroscopic systems, as
one would expect, since the basic principles of quantum mechanics apply to systems of any
size.
A classical probabilistic description of a random (stochastic) process also uses a sample
space. In the case of a coin flipped three times it consists of the 8 mutually exclusive
possibilities, here called histories, HHH , HHT , HTH , . . . , TTT , where H stands for
“heads” and T for “tails.” (Note that two histories are distinct elements of the sample space
if they differ at any of the three times.) In the same way, in quantum mechanics histories are
sequences of quantum events at a succession of times, each represented by a subspace (or its
projector) of the quantum Hilbert space. (For technical reasons it is convenient to represent
histories as projectors on tensor products of copies of the system’s Hilbert space.33) The
behavior of a real coin made up of atoms can be described in quantum terms using a suitable
(large) Hilbert space, so the 8 mutually exclusive possibilities of flipping it three times in a
row also form a quantum sample space or family of histories.
Sample spaces are needed to make probabilistic reasoning precise, and while the sloppy
physicist’s approach that ignores this is adequate for many purposes, in quantum mechanics
it leads to confusion. The first step in clearing up the conceptual difficulties which have
bothered Feynman and everyone else is to introduce well-defined sample spaces for proba-
bilities. The second step is to insist that incompatible sample spaces not be combined, for
the combination will not make sense. In the histories approach this is done by a strict appli-
cation of what is called the single framework rule,34 which asserts in essence that quantum
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probabilistic reasoning must be carried out using a single sample space. Given two compat-
ible quantum sample spaces this single space is easily constructed from them by a process
of refinement35, whereas if they are incompatible the refinement does not exist. Combining
incompatible quantum sample spaces in a way contrary to the single framework rule is at
the heart of most quantum paradoxes, and identifying the point at which this happens is
the key step in resolving (or, as I prefer to say, taming) such a paradox.
Once a sample space or family of histories has been defined, the next task is assigning
probabilities. For present purposes it suffices to consider a finite sample space, so the prob-
abilities are a collection of nonnegative numbers, one for each history in the space, that sum
to 1. Probability theory as such contains no rules for assigning these probabilities. In quan-
tum theory Schro¨dinger’s equation can be used to assign probabilities to certain families of
histories in a closed or isolated quantum system (no interaction with something outside the
system), the situation in which Schro¨dinger’s equation applies. The simplest case involves
only two times t0 and t1, a single state |ψ0〉 at time t0, and an orthonormal basis {|φ
j
1〉},
j = 1, 2, . . ., at t1. If the Hamiltonian H is independent of time the time evolution operator
obtained by integrating Schro¨dinger’s equation is
T (t′, t) = e−i(t
′
−t)H/~, (3)
and the Born rule then gives
Pr(φj1 |ψ0) = |〈φ
j
1|T (t1, t0)|ψ0〉|
2 (4)
as the conditional probability of |φj1〉 at time t1 given |ψ0〉 at t0. The fairly obvious general-
ization (see (2))
Pr(Pj |ψ0) = 〈ψ0|T (t0, t1)PjT (t1, t0)|ψ0〉 (5)
of (3) is also referred to as the Born rule. (Formulas (4) and (5) apply if the Hamiltonian
depends on time, but then (3) no longer gives the relationship between T and H .)
Unlike those in quantum textbooks, the probabilities in (4) and (5) do not refer to
outcomes of some external measurement, but to physical states inside the closed system
described by the Hamiltonian used in (3). Born’s rule is a fundamental law of nature, on
the same footing with Schro¨dinger’s equation and equally important. If one is interested in
how a real measuring apparatus will interact with a quantum system, one should include
the apparatus itself as part of the overall quantum system and then apply (4) or (5) to the
combination. Examples are discussed in Secs. V and VI below. It is worth noting that t0 may
either precede t1 or follow t1. The fundamental law for quantum probabilities, and its exten-
sions (see below), does not single out a sense of time. This important symmetry is entirely
lost sight of in the measurement-based approach to quantum theory, since measurements are
inherently irreversible (in the thermodynamic sense).
The right side of (4) is often written as |〈φj1|ψˆ1〉|
2, where
|ψˆ1〉 = T (t1, t0)|ψ0〉 (6)
is obtained from |ψ0〉 by integrating Schro¨dinger’s equation from t0 to t1. When used in this
way |ψˆ1〉, which is typically incompatible with the basis states {|φ
j
1〉}, does not represent the
physical reality of the quantum system at time t1. It is instead a mathematical construct,
a pre-probability36 used for computing probabilities. One could equally well compute them
9
by starting with each of the states |φj1〉 and integrating Schro¨dinger’s equation in the reverse
direction from t1 to t0, making no reference whatsoever to |ψˆ1〉. For further discussion, see
Sec. 9.4 of Ref. 14.
Indeed, |ψˆ1〉 could be the infamous Schro¨dinger cat state
37. To discuss whether the cat
is dead or alive, one should use a framework, that is to say an orthonormal basis (or, to
be more practical, a decomposition of the identity) for which such concepts make sense,
and then compute probabilities. Since |ψˆ1〉 is a computational tool, it requires no physical
interpretation, and within the context of this framework, it cannot be given a physical
interpretation, for it is incompatible with the sample space used to describe whether the cat
is still alive. To be sure, one could instead adopt a different, incompatible framework or
orthonormal basis that includes |ψˆ1〉 as one of its elements, in which case Born’s formula will
tell us that it occurs with (conditional) probability 1. In this second framework it makes no
sense to ask whether the cat is dead or alive, since the corresponding quantum properties
are incompatible with |ψˆ1〉. In quantum mechanics, as in the case of Mount Shasta, certain
perspectives are useful for answering certain questions, and are not useful for answering other
questions. The trouble with most treatments of Schro¨dinger’s cat is that they attempt to
discuss its morbidity while assuming that |ψˆ1〉 is its physical state, which makes no more
sense than talking about Sz for spin-half particle whose x component of angular momentum
is +1/2.
For a complete stochastic description of time development of a closed quantum system
it is necessary to go beyond the Born rule and provide formulas for calculating probabilities
of histories involving three or more times. This extension is not trivial, as consistent proba-
bilities can only be assigned if certain consistency conditions are satisfied. Discussing them
here would lead to a somewhat lengthy detour from our main theme, and as they are treated
in detail elsewhere38, we shall move on to describe how consistent probability assignments
within the context of simple models can help dissipate quantum mysteries.
V Toy Models
A major difficulty in teaching quantum mechanics is that solving the time-dependent
Schro¨dinger equation is at best a time-consuming process, and often cannot be done in
closed form. This makes it difficult for students to gain an intuitive understanding of what
it involves. The advent of computer simulations with graphical output39 is thus a welcome
addition to the repertoire of teaching tools. However, these need to be supplemented by an
alternative approach using toy models, which, while somewhat unrealistic, have the virtue
that they can be worked out using a pencil on the back of the traditional envelope.40
The basic idea is to discretize time so that it advances in integer steps, and the time
development operator in (3) takes the form of an integer power
T (t′, t) = T t
′
−t (7)
of some very simple unitary operator T , typically one representing a hopping motion of one
or more particles. For example, T = S, where
S|m〉 = |m+ 1〉, S|M〉 = | −M〉 (8)
is a shift operator moving a particle from a lattice site or node or “box” at site m, where
m is an integer, to the next site. The periodic boundary condition in (8) ensures that S
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is a unitary operator on the finite-dimensional Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {|m〉},
−M ≤ m ≤M , where M can be as large as one wants; typically much larger than the times
of interest. Figure 2 shows a modification in which (8) holds except for m = 0 and −1, for
which
S|0〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, S| − 1〉 = −β∗|0〉+ α∗|1〉, (9)
with |α|2+ |β|2 = 1. One can think of this as a simple model of a decaying system: an alpha
1 2 3 4 5
−1 −2 −3 −4 −5
0
m =
m =
0 1 2 3n =α
β
α∗
−β∗
Figure 2: Toy model of particle decay with detector. The sites m refer to the particle and n
to the pointer of the detector.
particle initially inside a nucleus at |m = 0〉 eventually escapes to m = 1 and then keeps
moving. The unitary time development of an initial state |ψ0〉 = |0〉 at t = 0 leads to
|ψt〉 = T
t|ψ0〉 = α
t|0〉+ β
[
αt−1|1〉+ αt−2|2〉+ · · ·+ |t〉
]
(10)
for 0 < t < M . Born’s rule gives |α|2t for the probability that the initial state has not yet
decayed. This decreases exponentially with t, as one might expect.
A way to make this model a useful tool for dissipating quantum mysteries is to add a toy
detector, thought of as the pointer on a toy measuring apparatus, with states labeled n in
Fig. 2. Let
S ′|n〉 = |n+ 1〉, except S ′|0〉 = |0〉 and S ′| − 1〉 = |1〉, (11)
be the corresponding shift operator, and again assume a periodic boundary condition S ′|N〉 =
|−N〉. The total time development operator on the tensor product of the particle and pointer
Hilbert spaces is
T = (S ⊗ I)R(I ⊗ S ′), (12)
where R(|m〉 ⊗ |n〉) = |m〉 ⊗ |n〉 is the identity I ⊗ I except for
R(|2〉 ⊗ |0〉) = |2〉 ⊗ |1〉, R(|2〉 ⊗ |1〉) = |2〉 ⊗ |0〉. (13)
If the detector pointer is initially at n = 0 in its “ready” state and the particle arrives at
m = 2, the effect of T is to kick the pointer to n = 1, after which it continues moving. At
the same time the particle continues on to m = 3, as it would have done in the absence of
the detector.
Unitary time development of an initial state |Ψ0〉 = |m = 0〉 ⊗ |n = 0〉 to a time t ≥ 3
results in
|Ψt〉 = T
t|Ψ0〉 =
[
αt|0〉+ βαt−1|1〉+ βαt−2|2〉
]
⊗ |0〉
+ β
[
αt−3|3〉 ⊗ |1〉+ αt−4|4〉 ⊗ |2〉+ · · ·+ |t〉 ⊗ |t− 2〉
]
. (14)
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Notice that in this expression the detector is in a superposition of different pointer positions,
so we have the toy analog of a Schro¨dinger cat—a Schro¨dinger kitten? A useful physical
interpretation is obtained by using the Born rule (4) at time t1 = t, with the orthonormal
basis {|m〉⊗ |n〉}, i.e., both particle and pointer are at definite locations. If we think of |Ψt〉
as a pre-probability, the analog of |ψˆ1〉 in (6), then the probability that the particle is at m
and the pointer at n at time t is just the absolute square of the corresponding coefficient
on the right side of (14). This joint probability distribution Pr(m,n) has exactly the same
properties and the same physical interpretation as in ordinary probably theory. In particular,
we can use it to compute the conditional probabilities Pr(m |n), and from them deduce that
if the pointer is at n = 0, then m ≤ 2, i.e., the alpha particle is still in the nucleus or
on its way to the detector; whereas if the pointer is at some n > 0, the particle is at the
location m = n+2, as one would expect if the particle triggered the detector while hopping
from m = 2 to 3. Quantum mechanics does not say which of these mutually exclusive and
physically reasonable possibilities is actually the case, but only provides probabilities.
This simple example, in which the measuring device is part of the total quantum system,
is useful in countering a number of misleading ideas that students unfortunately pick up while
taking elementary (and more advanced) quantum courses: that particles (and pointers) can
be in two places at the same time, that quantum mechanics necessarily leaves everything
in a fog, that there are magical long-range influences, etc. Note in particular how wave
function collapse is not needed when probabilities are introduced in a consistent way into
quantum theory. Removing wave function collapse from textbooks and replacing it with con-
ditional probabilities would be a significant step towards improving students’ understanding
of quantum mechanics.
The preceding discussion might tempt one to conclude that if at t = 5 the pointer is at
n = 1, then at t = 2 the particle was at m = 1. This conclusion is correct, but cannot be
justified on the basis of the Born rule alone, as it involves probabilistic reasoning applied to
a closed quantum system at 3 different times: the initial state at t = 0, the pointer position
at t = 5, and the particle position at t = 3. One must use an appropriate extension of the
Born rule and check for consistency.41 We will give another example in the next section of
how measurement outcomes can be used to infer properties of a measured system before the
measurement took place.
VI Measurements Reconsidered
Measurement apparatus is essential for experiments exploring the quantum properties of
microscopic systems, for it amplifies very small effects and makes them visible or audible
or otherwise evident in macroscopic effects accessible to human beings. Thus it is very
important to understand how the apparatus works, and how its macroscopic output is related
to the microscopic input. Does the process introduce noise, and if so how much? Is the
output influenced by extraneous effects? These questions can be studied to some extent
by carrying out experimental tests. But an important theoretical component goes into
such analyses, and in this respect measurement-based quantum mechanics as found in the
textbooks is inadequate. It is hard to analyze real measurements when the very concept
of a measurement is considered as axiomatic, and thus unanalyzable in quantum terms.
Introducing probabilities in a consistent way makes it possible, in principle, to analyze real
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apparatus in a completely quantum mechanical way. Future experimentalists, and theorists
who give them advice, need to know that a consistent approach to these questions exists, that
it does not depend upon dubious ideas like wave function collapse, and that it supports many
of the general intuitions which experimental physicists have about measuring apparatus, such
as the fact that if there is a collimator between source and particle detector, then on its way
to the detector the particle has to pass through the hole in the collimator. At the same
time it places limits on that intuition, and indicates places at which it will break down and
caution needs to be observed. This article is not the place to go into details, but the most
essential ideas can be explained in terms of a simple example, a somewhat idealized and
modernized version of the famous Stern-Gerlach measurement.26 This will show how the
measurement-based approach of textbooks can be unhelpful and misleading even when it is
in some respects correct, and how to replace it with something more useful.
+
−
Magnet
t0 t1 t2 t3
Figure 3: Stern-Gerlach apparatus separating particles into Sz = ±1/2 beams, which are
then detected.
Figure 3 shows the well-known schematic diagram: a stream of spin-half particles enter
on the left and are separated into two outgoing beams: the upper one corresponding to
Sz = +1/2 and the lower to Sz = −1/2, for a magnetic field gradient in the z direction.
That is, if at time t1 just before entering the apparatus the spin state is Sz = +1/2, the
particle will emerge in the upper beam, and can be detected by the upper detector. Similarly,
if Sz = −1/2 the particle will emerge in the lower beam and be detected there. We suppose
that the magnetic field is negligible at and to the left of t1 in Fig. 3.
What will happen if the particle is prepared, via some previous apparatus, so that it is in
in a state with Sx = +1/2 at a time t0 < t1? Since Sx = +1/2 is a linear superposition of the
Sz = +1/2 and Sz = −1/2 states with equal amplitude, the standard (correct) answer is that
it will be detected with probability 1/2 in the upper and probability 1/2 in the lower beam.
Suppose it has been detected by the upper detector, as indicated by a pointer on that device,
at time t3. Was the particle in the upper beam at time t2, after leaving the field gradient but
before detection? Experimental physicists will tend to answer that it was, for otherwise they
will have difficulty designing equipment, thinking about errors, etc. Theoretical physicists
trained in the usual textbook approach may disagree, for they think of the original spin
superposition as developing unitarily into a superposition of two wave packets, one traveling
upwards and one downwards after the atom leaves the field gradient. (Let us assume the
vacuum is good enough that decoherence from collisions does not complicate matters.) And
what can one say about the spin state of a particle at the earlier time t1 if it is later detected
by the upper detector?
All of these questions have reasonable answers if one abandons the measurement approach
and instead introduces microscopic quantum probabilities on appropriate sample spaces, that
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is, consistent families of quantum histories. The key issue is the choice of sample space, for in
a situation of this sort there are several incompatible alternatives. We will consider various
possibilities, always assuming as given data an initial Sx = +1/2 spin state and detectors
in the ready state at time t0, and that at time t3 it is the upper detector that has been
triggered by the arrival of the particle. Note that the detectors are here thought of as part
of a large closed quantum system that also includes the particle.
A first consistent family Fa can be represented, using the notation employed in Ref. 14,
in the form
u ⊙U
Fa : x
+ ⊙ I ⊙
{
l ⊙ L
t0 t1 t2 t3
(15)
Here each letter represents a projector in a history associated with the four successive times
t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 indicated on the lower line, and the ⊙ symbols can for present purposes be
thought of as commas separating the projectors at successive times.42 In particular, x+ at
the time t0
43 means Sx = +1/2, the identity I at t1 indicates that no information is being
provided about the state of the particle at this time (in contrast to (18) and (20) below), u
and l at t2 signify that the particle is in the upper and lower path, respectively, while U and
L are projectors corresponding to the upper and lower detector, respectively, having detected
the particle at t3. One can think of (15) as a shorthand for two histories, x
+ ⊗ I ⊗ u ⊗ U
and x+⊗ I ⊗ l⊗L, with the curly brace indicating that they are identical up to the time t1.
The extended Born rule44 assigns a probability of 1/2 to each of the two histories in (15).
The conditional probabilities
Pr(u2 |U3) = 1, Pr(l2 |U3) = 0, (16)
where the subscripts refer to times t2 and t3, follow at once from the fact that there is only
one history in Fa for which the upper detector triggers, and in that history U is preceded
by u, not l. What (16) tells us is that if the upper detector triggers, one can be certain that
at the earlier time t2 the particle was following the upper and not the lower path. So the
experimentalist is right.
But there is also a second consistent family
U
Fb : x
+ ⊙ I ⊙ c⊙
{
L
(17)
where the times are the same as in (15). Here c at t2 is a projector onto the coherent
superposition of states that evolve from the initial state with Sx = +1/2, and since it is
found in both histories, it occurs with probability 1, just as the theoretician supposed. Since
both Fa and Fb are consistent families, the conclusions of a probabilistic analysis applied
using just one of them while disregarding the other will be correct. However, the families are
incompatible, and so these conclusions cannot be combined. One cannot say that at time t2
the particle is both in a superposition state c AND that it is moving on the upper trajectory
u, for that would be meaningless in the same way that “Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = +1/2” makes
no sense. Note that incompatibility, the fact that the two families cannot be combined, does
not mean that one is “wrong” and the other is “right.” Seeking some law of nature which
“chooses” one rather than the other is to misunderstand the nature of quantum descriptions.
It is the physicist who chooses which description to use, depending upon the sort of question
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he is asking, while noting that only descriptions compatible with the desired information
will be useful for this purpose. Remember Mount Shasta.
Thus far we have said nothing about the spin state of the particle at the time t1 when it
is just about to enter the field gradient; both Fa and Fb contain a noncommittal I at t1. It
is again useful to consider two different consistent families. In
z+ ⊙ u⊙U
Fc : x
+ ⊙
{
z− ⊙ l ⊙ L
(18)
one can talk about Sz at t1: the projectors z
+ and z− correspond to Sz = ±1/2. Once again
there is only one history that terminates in U , and therefore
Pr(z+1 |U3) = 1, Pr(z
−
1 |U3) = 0. (19)
That is, one can be sure that if the upper detector detected the particle, Sz had the value
+1/2, not −1/2, at the earlier time t1. This is what one would expect if the total apparatus,
which consists of field gradient followed by detectors, functions as designed, as a device to
measure the z component of the spin of a spin-half particle.
In the second consistent family
U
Fd : x
+ ⊙ x+ ⊙ I ⊙
{
L
(20)
it is Sx that makes sense at t1, and Sx = +1/2 occurs with probability 1. This family is
of no use in deciding whether the measuring apparatus is functioning properly, since that
question makes reference to Sz at t1 and not Sx, but it could provide a check on whether
the region traversed by the particle during the interval from t0 to t1 was free of magnetic
fields, as we have supposed. Of course, Fd is incompatible with Fc, so it makes no sense to
combine the probability 1 inferences obtained by using them separately. (Incidentally, in Fd
one could replace the I at time t2 with the pair u and l, as in (18). The result would be a
family F ′d which would serve equally well for the matters we have been discussing. Likewise,
in Fc one could replace u and l at t2 with I.)
The following conceptual difficulty can arise when using the family Fc. How can it be
that Sx = +1/2 at t0 (as an initial datum) and Sz = +1/2 at t1 (with probability 1) if
there is no magnetic field acting on the particle during the time interval between t0 and t1,
and thus no torque which could have caused the spin direction to precess from +x to +z?
This problem arises from a misleading mental picture of a spin-half particle in the state
Sx = +1/2. One tends to think of it as a little gyroscope with its axis of rotation lined up
precisely along the +x axis, and if at a later time the gyroscope axis is in the +z direction,
this must have come about through the application of a torque. But a gyroscope has y and
z components of angular momentum equal to 0 if its axis is in the x direction, whereas for
a spin-half particle these other components are undefined when Sx = +1/2. A better, less
misleading image is to think of Sx = +1/2 as resembling a gyroscope with its axis in a
random direction, i.e., random y and z components of angular momentum, subject only to
the constraint that the x component is fixed. Then even if the gyroscope is not subject to
a torque, there is no reason why its x component of angular momentum cannot be positive
at one time and its z component positive at a later time. Classical images of some sort are
probably essential in quantum physics, since they help us organize intuitive knowledge, and
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they always mislead to some extent. But some mislead less than others, as shown by this
example.
One can continue the discussion of the Stern-Gerlach experiment using additional families
of histories which combine information about a spin component at t1 with information about
a position or superposition of positions at t2, but the preceding suffices for making the main
points. Families Fb and Fd correspond in a rough sense to the viewpoint of von Neumann
and the typical textbook, in which unitary time development persists up until the last
instant before the final measurement, meaning the amplification of a microscopic signal to a
macroscopic level, takes place. Thus they show that the textbook approach makes a certain
amount of sense. However, the conclusions we reached using Fb and Fd are based on the
systematic use of fundamental principles of quantum dynamics applied to a closed quantum
system, not on anything specific to a measurement, and standard probabilistic reasoning,
not guesswork or arm waving.
On the other hand, Fa and Fc provide the sort of information needed by someone design-
ing a quantum measuring apparatus, or analyzing how it functions. The key point is that
such an analysis in quantum terms is only possible if the relevant properties of the measured
system at a time before the measurement takes place are part of the quantum description.
This is not so in the usual textbook approach, which is defective not in that it is wrong—as
we have seen, it can be justified to some extent by using families like Fb and Fd—but in that
equally valid alternatives for discussing quantum time development are never mentioned,
and the student is left with the incorrect idea that quantum measurements really do not
measure anything, they just cause the great smoky dragon45 to collapse.
VII Practical Considerations
For a period of ten years I have been teaching various advanced undergraduate and
beginning graduate quantum mechanics courses, and courses in quantum information, using
the new perspective in which quantum mechanics is based on probabilistic laws of universal
validity, with measurements being only one of the applications. The reaction of students
has generally been positive, though there are always signs of shock when I tell them that
by the end of the course, and provided they do their homework, they will understand (some
aspects of) quantum mechanics better than Feynman did. Homework and examinations
results indicate that they understand this material about as well, or as badly, as other topics
in such courses, but there have been no follow-up studies to see what they have retained a
year later.
How long does it take to present the new ideas? Longer than the material they replace,
but not enormously so. Courses at the advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate level
typically devote a certain amount of time to introducing fundamental quantum concepts;
defining a quantum Hilbert space, Dirac notation, tensor products; introducing Schro¨dinger’s
equation and a probabilistic interpretation of the formalism; and examples illustrating all of
these. Before moving on to angular momentum, the hydrogen atom, scattering, and so forth.
It is in the first part that changes are most needed, and my experience suggests that the
revised version requires about six weeks total (of a fourteen week semester) in an introductory
graduate course; perhaps one or two more than if one follows the older approach. The new
material includes a proper discussion of quantum incompatibility; histories and consistency
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conditions; the toy models needed to provide illustrations; and a one hour introduction to
probability theory for students who have not yet had a course in that subject. Along the
way the students learn how to deal with the double slit paradox, or the equivalent using a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, in a reasonable way. Resolving the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
problem28 without invoking long range influences requires less than one additional class
period if the foundations have been properly laid. There is no need to consider Bell’s
inequality,17 though this can serve as a useful illustration of what goes wrong when one
tries to import classical ideas into the quantum world.
What gives the students the most difficulty? Quantum incompatibility. The problems
they face are analogous to those encountered when first studying relativity, only worse: habits
of classical reasoning lie closer to the soul of the apprentice physicist than does the notion
of temporal simultaneity. However, just as students are capable of learning that putting x
to the left of p in quantum theory does not yield anything like the classical xp, they can
also learn its logical counterpart, especially if one starts with the simple case of spin half.
Next in order of (decreasing) difficulty come consistency relations.46 Followed by probability
theory in the case of students who have never been exposed to its formal structure, nor dealt
with simple stochastic processes.47 Fortunately, in an introductory quantum course one can
get by with finite sample spaces and finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, with only some talk
about their infinite counterparts, so the formal mathematics is not very difficult.
A different kind of conceptual barrier can be present, especially for graduate students
who in previous courses taught by respected teachers have learned the measurement-based
approach to quantum mechanics with wave function collapse, etc., while never becoming
aware of its many shortcomings and inconsistencies. It is then hard to persuade them to pay
serious attention to something which appears contrary to what they think of as quantum
orthodoxy. Another objection that is raised, again primarily by graduate students, is that
they are being required to learn esoteric material about quantum foundations, rather than
how to do calculations that will aid them in passing exams and preparing for research. The
fact that students are often hesitant to express these reservations openly to the teacher
makes it harder to deal with them. When countering prejudices of this type I think it not
inappropriate to point out that Feynman, who knew how to do calculations better than most
of us, was quite forthright in admitting that he did not understand quantum mechanics as
formulated in the traditional way, and that anecdotal evidence suggests he was impressed
by the new ideas when he first heard them shortly before his untimely death.48
What material is available for a course taught from the new point of view? No textbook,
so far as I know, has incorporated the new ideas.49 There are two monographs by Omne`s,12
of which the second is simpler. My own book14 is simpler still, and can be used as a
supplement to a regular textbook. The most crucial chapters are available on the Internet,
along with a small number of exercises.
VIII Conclusion
I have argued that the treatment of quantum probabilities found in textbooks, where they
are introduced in connection with measurement outcomes, is a major source of conceptual
difficulties for students trying to learn the subject. And that modern developments in our
understanding of quantum mechanics make it possible to do a much better job, through
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a systematic and coherent introduction of microscopic probabilities as a fundamental part
of the theory. Measurements can then be understood as particular examples of quantum
processes, not as something fundamentally different, and can be shown to reveal something
about the measured system before the measurement took place. Wave function collapse can
be assigned to the trash can of outmoded ideas, replaced by a consistent use of conditional
probabilities. Furthermore, such an approach is not beyond the grasp of students, especially
when explained with the aid of toy models that allow them to understand the fundamentals
of quantum dynamics without becoming entangled in the technical difficulties of solving
Schro¨dinger’s equation. As a consequence, students can now begin to understand those
aspects of quantum mechanics that Feynman found so difficult.
Even the reader who thinks these arguments have merit may well ask, and properly so,
whether it is really worthwhile replacing the traditional approach embodied in standard
textbooks with something newer. Has not the older approach, whatever its flaws, allowed
several generations of physicists to carry out excellent research? Have not the textbooks been
written by authors with considerable pedagogical skill? Indeed, are the conceptual gaps,
which even textbook writers themselves have sometimes acknowledged,50 all that serious?
Do not good physicists, whether engaged in theory or experiment, eventually develop the
sort of intuition which allows them to work around deficiencies in their courses? Do not our
present courses at least teach students how to calculate things in agreement with experiment?
While sympathetic with such concerns, I must ask: Is it our primary goal to impart
calculational skills to our students? No doubt this is one of the things we aim to do. The
engineering student who can successfully apply the formula numbered 37 in his freshman
mechanics text to a physics problem will succeed later, we hope, in applying the right formula
from the appropriate engineering handbook to some design problem. The difficulty comes
in situations in which formula 37 is no longer applicable, or perhaps one is not sure whether
it applies, or maybe it is necessary to make some approximations, and good judgment is
needed as to whether these are appropriate, etc. There are lots of reasons why when we
teach classical mechanics we want our students not only to know the formulas in the blue
boxes, but to imbed them in a real understanding of the deeper principles of the subject. If
this is so, should our goal in the case of quantum mechanics be different?
To be sure, in any discipline of physics one eventually arrives at principles which in our
present state of knowledge cannot be explained in terms of anything more fundamental. At
that stage we have to stop and recognize that there is a limitation to our understanding,
there are things that simply have to be accepted on faith, hopefully supported by the fact
that they have been shown to work in a large number of circumstances. Especially when we
have a consistent and coherent framework for some subject there is no reason to apologize,
even when we know it is at best an approximation to the real world. Classical electricity and
magnetism has this character. It is approximate (the real world is quantized) and there are
always some loose ends to be understood better, but overall it is satisfactory, and we teach
it with confidence to our students.
The situation in quantum mechanics, as reflected in current textbooks, is very different. A
significant contribution of decades of research in quantum foundations has been to remind the
community that quantum mechanics as traditionally taught contains all sorts of unresolved
problems and paradoxes that cast serious doubt on its coherence as an intellectual discipline.
These issues were often ignored in older textbooks, but newer ones feel obliged to devote at
least a few pages to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and similar things. This acknowledges, in an
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indirect way, that the system being taught has serious flaws, and in this respect textbook
writers are at last catching up to what Feynman was saying in 1964. Is this flawed approach
what we want to pass on to our students, or should we aim for something better?
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